Introduction
"To be at all -to exist in any way -is to be somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in some kind of place. Place is as requisite as the air we breathe, the ground on which we stand, the bodies we have. We are surrounded by places. We walk over them and through them. We live in places, relate to others in them, die in them...." Casey, 1997 :ix This chapter argues that our bodily experience of place may provide a key to achieving a contextualised sense of presence in virtual environments. We begin by briefly reviewing current practice in evaluating virtual environments. The evaluating of these environments hinges on measuring our sense of being there. This is treated as our sense of presence but as we will show this is a curious decontextualised sense of being there. From there we turn to the question of contextualised presence -what it is and why it is becoming important for current and emerging virtual reality (VR) applications. We draw upon the philosophical, empirical and phenomenological treatments of body, place and the conjunction of the two to inform this discussion. We conclude by proposing a new paradigm for designing and evaluating contextualised virtual environments, based on the metaphor of tourism and the tourist gaze (Urry, 2002) .
Understanding Presence
Understanding and measuring presence is a key aim of virtual reality research. Presence has numerous and frequently conflicting definitions. Lombard and Ditton's (1997) review of the usage of the term revealed six different explications in the VR literature: these include social richness, realism, transportation, immersion, social actor within medium and medium as social actor. Despite this diversity they concluded that in the context of immersive VR (as opposed to desktop or non-immersive VR) that presence was most usually characterised as transportation. (Terms such as co-presence and social presence are also used to denote the sense of being together with others in such environments). In contrast to these rather loose, qualitative descriptions of presence, Schloerb (1995) has proposed a quantitative approach to the problem, comprising two categories of presence, subjective and objective. Subjective presence relates to judgements an individual might make of their sense of 'being there' while the objective variety is measured by an individual carrying out a task in the virtual environment. This interest in the objective, empirical and task-orientation may reflect the origins of presence research revealed by the full title of the premier VR journal -Presence: tele-operators and virtual environments. Underpinning these variations in defining this key concept (and perhaps being a contributory factor to this variation) is the range of theoretical bases for the study of presence. In a recent review of presence research, Schuemie et al. (2001) identify a number of 'theories' (the term is used very loosely) cited in the VR literature. Unsurprisingly, psychology figures strongly, for example, Alcañiz et al. note that, " There is no doubt that it [Presence] is formed through an interplay of raw sensory data and various cognitive structures. " (2002:202) . Variants on involvement (e.g. Witmer and Singer, 1998; Ryan, 2000) are also frequently cited and more recently the role of the body, affect and the importance of narrative are beginning to appear (e.g. Slater et al., 1998 , Alcañiz et al. (2002 and Ryan, 2000 respectively).
The problem of context in virtual environments
One perspective which is conspicuous by its absence is any consideration of context. VR / presence research is wholly decontextualised. VR researchers are interested, in both a general and highly specific sense, as to whether the users of their systems perceive themselves to be present or immersed in that particular virtual world. There is a concentration on the fidelity of representation of Euclidian space and its properties (collision detection, perspective, depth perception); a case of computer science / mathematics meets cognitive psychology. Furthermore these representations are very frequently generic situations -they are placeless, for example, buildings are represented on endless Euclidean planes. To date VR technology has allowed us to create virtual spaces and environments which can be defined by means of coordinate geometry, not virtual places. As Casey puts it, "The triumph of space over place is the triumph of space in its endless extensiveness, its coordinated and dimensional spreadoutness, over the intensive magnitude and qualitative multiplicity of concrete places." Casey, 1997: 201 . However these spaces are nowhere: places in contrast are always somewhere. At their simplest, and as we shall see there are numerous descriptions and definitions, places are lived spaces. Places are contextualised, existential spaces. The role and importance of the body has largely been ignored by designers of VR systems, human-computer interaction designers, psychologists and most philosophers -until quite recently. Perhaps part of the problem is that bodies are a given and everyday and as such not particularly worthy of note. The philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945) is usually credited with bringing our attention to our bodies; while ecological psychology -largely initiated by Gibson (1986) has investigated the role of the body in our dealings with the world. The place of the body in the design of interactive systems has largely been confined, (Dourish, 2001 is a notable exception), to the discipline of ergonomics (Murrell, 1965) . As virtual reality continues to develop meaningful applications, it will become necessary to grasp the nettle of understanding how we experience and understand these contextualised virtual spaces, these virtual places. The key research question being, "how do create lived, embodied virtual spaces?"
Context, presence and measurement in VR
In contextualising presence we move the locus of attention from trying to assess an individual's sense of 'being there' to ask the question of the participant in a VR experiment, 'Where are you?" and of ourselves, 'Where am I?". A recovering patient or accident victim's first words on regaining consciousness are, almost always, 'Where am I?". It is not a matter of debate that they are present -unless the accident has been remarkably destructive. This primordial focus on place is not confined to adult, experimentally-inclined or accident-prone members of our species. Children are often deeply attached to special places. An animal perceives his territory as, in some sense 'his' which he defends against intruders of the same species. It would be easy to speculate phylogenetically that a sense of place or belonging to a place might have given rise to a sense of identity, a self of self, of self-awareness or being somewhere and then later in the decontextualised laboratory, a disembodied sense of beingthere. Indeed, there is much research in personal and developmental psychology in this vein, but as interesting as this discussion is, it must wait from another day. The problem in hand is a practical one: what do we do about asking the right questions about peoples' experiences of contextualised virtual reality?
Present where?
We have suggested that there is an increasing focus on grounding VR applications in real purposes: examples of these are realistic, grounded training environments and the ever present virtual tourism. Before discussing these in a little detail, we also recognise that this a nascent application area and other examples might include virtual archaeology, for example, recreating a fragile site such as Lascaux. A virtual Lascaux would permit the experience of being there -not just viewing the pictures on the walls -but feeling the claustrophobia of the cave.
Training environments
There is considerable interest in creating realistic virtual environments -low cost simulatorsfor use in a range of different training setting. Of these, safety-critical and emergency management applications are of particular industrial importance. The recent DISCOVER project aimed to create a pair of real, virtual environments, namely, an oil platform (the offshore application) and a commercial ship (the maritime application) -the "SS Oxymoron'. See Turner and Turner, 2000 for a discussion of the project. The project aimed to create a pair of collaborative virtual environments (CVE) to supplement and perhaps even replace physical simulators. Conventional physical simulators are expensive and can be physically enormous (see figure 1 below). Their clear strength as a training environment lies with a simple observation made by one of the trainers to us, "After thirty minutes, the trainees refers to the simulator as my ship'. Not only do the trainees experience a sense of presence but of involvement, identity and a relationship with the simulator which approaches the real thing. A physical simulator can create a sense of contextualised presence, a sense of place by looking, behaving, smelling and moving like the real ship it is simulating. More than this, some of the time it is used in ways indistinguishable from a real ship (this points at the importance of the reality, fidelity and truth of the training scenario). One of the physical simulators used at a DISCOVER partner site was exploited to help determine which trainees should be promoted. We (as part of the project team) were told of one instance where a trainee was involved in a (virtual) collision between his (virtual) ship and a (virtual) dock which resulted in his (real) dismissal. As we have already noted, the aim of the maritime-aspect DISCOVER project was to create a real-virtual ship which could be used to deliver credible safety-critical training to senior mariners. The challenge was to create that sense of 'my ship' when engaged with the CVE maritime simulator. While it would be stretching the truth to say that we succeeded in creating a sense of ship, we did learn that the most important factor was the realism of the narrative used to engage / train the mariners (see Turner and Turner, 2002) . We return to the role of narrative in creating virtual places later in this chapter.
Virtual tourism
The BENOGO project is part of the Future and Emerging Technology (FET) programme funded by the European Union (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , intended to identify key VR research areas. BENOGO is developing novel technology while in parallel defining an application for that technology. The technology is concerned with real-time image based rendering (e.g. Bakstein and Pajdla 2003; Feldman et al., 2003) while the application area is 'being there without going' -to quote the project's by-line. Rather than visiting a place in person, individuals will be able to experience a specific place, say, the interior of Notre Dame in Paris by donning a head mounted display (HMD) through which photorealistic images will be experienced. Early experiments with the BENOGO technology have hinted at what might be achieved but also highlight the very real challenges of trying to recreate real places convincingly. In the first of these studies a photo-realistic virtual representation of a glasshouse in the Prague botanical gardens was recreated (figure 3 is an image taken in the botanical gardens). Participants experienced a 360° panorama of the interior of the tropical glasshouse via a headmounted display. A second study used a photo-realistic representation of a spacious stairway and landing at the Technical University of Prague, again presented by a head-mounted display. This was augmented by a computer-generated table on the landing behind which participants sat on at real table and chair. The audio environment was silent save for the augmented sound of breaking glass. The major difference in this study was the introduction of a contextualising narrative in the form of a scenario. Participants were asked to imagine themselves as a security guard on the stairs and to report any untoward events to security control room staff (played by a member of the project team). The sound of breaking glass part way through the ten minutes exploration was designed to fit this scenario. Though the two experimental studies were very broadly similar in terms of their technical aspects, the experiences they afforded differed significantly. People were much more engaged in the security guard study and even found a rationale for sounds and movements which were not intentionally introduced into the environment but which were consistent with the scenario. As one participant said, while playing the role of the security guard, "I think it took a lot of my attention just looking down, if anybody were coming in or going and then of course I was listening to all these… these voices around …"
The voices were overheard from unrelated activity in the surrounding laboratory. This highlights (at least) two important issues: firstly, the use of a meaningful narrative significantly adds to engagement and sense of being in that place. Secondly, tools and instruments used in the evaluation of virtual environments are too decontextualised to be of any great value in situations such as this.
Of bodies and places
The literature on place research helps us to understand, reason about and express what it means to be somewhere specific (i.e. a place). This section briefly reviews three overlapping perspectives on place. The first of these is the philosophical; we then consider the empirical (embracing psychological and sociological perspectives) and the first-person or phenomenological. Each is necessarily a brief sketch. Perhaps the most substantial strands of twentieth-century writings on place are the crucial notion of place as interaction, vide Derrida's "denial that place… place is an event, a matter of taking place." (Casey, 1997, p.339 .) The strong emphasis on place as a fundamentally embodied phenomenon.
Philosophical perspectives
The scant attention paid to the contextualisation of virtual space has parallels in the philosophical treatment of the nature of being, space and place. The short account which now follows draws heavily on Edward Casey's monograph The Fate of Place (Casey, 1997) . Interestingly, the earliest writers were clear about the fundamental association between being and place. In the fourth century B.C., for example, we find Archytas of Tarentum observing that: "to be (at all) is to be in (some) place" Casey, ibid, p.4 And half a century or so later, Aristotle includes where as one of the ten essential characteristics of every substance. Aristotle's concept of place is as a container or boundary for an object, as in the sense of being held in place -an intriguing pre-figuring of the physical restrictions of some forms of virtual reality. However, from Plato until the almost the present, this archaic primacy of place is submerged in Euclidean space, in concepts of the relationship between space and time, and in the dominance of the positivist scientific paradigm directed at uncovering universally applicable laws. Place disappears as a fundamental aspect of being and becomes a mere site or specific instance of universal Euclidean space, until the concept is reclaimed by modern and post-modern authors, notably (among others).
Place and Bodies: Intertwined Perspectives
As Casey so ably shows, Kant, Whitehead, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty were all active in reintroducing place to philosophical discourse and were instrumental in demonstrating the importance of the body when thinking about place. Kant speaks of '… this body is my body; and the place of that body is at the same time my place' (Dreams of a Spirit-Seer). Kant goes on to argue that positions in space are relational, that is, should be understood in reference to the sides of the body, to the moving body and so forth. These ideas were neither fully developed or widely adopted and lay dormant until Whitehead's critique which appeared in Science and the Modern World (Whitehead, 1925 (Whitehead, / 1997 .
"We have to admit that the body is the organism whose states regulate our cognition of the world. The unity of the perceptual field therefore must be a unity of bodily experience".
Science and the Modern World (Whitehead, 1925: 91) We begin this review of the body, place and being-in-the-world with a brief treatment of the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.
Husserl
Husserl noted the 'privileged position' of the human body: in one respect it is merely an unremarkable physical thing, but it is also the Leib -a lived body. The lived body is the bearer of the 'I'. However for Husserl, the body not only gives rise to the three dimensions but "everything that appears belongs to its environs" -everything which is encountered is around the body.
Merleau-Ponty
In his Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty argues that it is only though our lived bodies do we have access to what he describes as the primary world. Without our bodies there could be no world. The lived body is central as it his corporeal intentionality, this concept replaces the Cartesian mind-body distinction. The world and the lived body together form what Merleau-Ponty calls an intentional arc which binds the body to the world. This arc anchors us in and to the world. More than this Merleau-Ponty argues that the movement of the lived body actually creates (produces) existential space (this is of particular interest as places are existential space). It is not, however, the 'objective' movement of the body as such, instead it is the experience of this movement, "Far from my body's being for me no more than a fragment of space, there would be no space at all for me if I had no body". To feel our body (kinaesthesia) feeling its surroundings is not merely an exercise in self-reflection but the means by which we 'prehend' the world. This kinaesthesic feedback is the means by which we both objectify the world and orient ourselves within it. To orientate ourselves is to adopt an external point or frame of reference. Thus we need bodies to both create the world and to orientate ourselves within it. Merleau-Ponty's position (and other closely related thought) is reflected in Tuan's work in humanistic geography, particularly his account of how the growing child learns to comprehend his place in the world (Tuan, 1977, ch. 3)
Heidegger: being-in-the-world Of Heidegger's complex and labyrinthine body of work, we have chosen to highlight two aspects only for the purposes of this discussion. In deciding to consider Heidegger's treatment of being-in-the-world as dwelling and his discussion of the nature of 'in' we will not consider Heidegger's explicit writings on space and spatiality or his discussion of readiness-to-hand or whether something is present-at-hand. Disregarding the role of the human body, Heidegger identifies the existential character of being-in-the-world with human beings propensity of inhabiting and dwelling. Dasein's way of being-in consists in dwelling or residing, that is, being 'alongside' the world as if it were at home there. The ideas of the phenomenological geographer Relph, discussed later in this chapter, draw heavily on these concepts. Heidegger holds that human beings (which he refers to as Dasein) and world are not two distinct entities but only one which results from Dasein's involvement in the world. Thus the in of being-in-the-world is unrelated to ideas of Aristotlean containment, instead in is better understood in terms of involvement. Heidegger characterises everyday life as being an engaged, absorbed involvement in an undifferentiated world. Coyne develops this idea in his Technoromanticism (1999) when he writes, "This is an experience with which everyone can identify: we are often most absorbed while working in the garden, driving, jogging, watching television, typing at a computer, or just engaged in the day-to-day routine of work. (In this respect, "immersion" is not a special feature of VR. A text editor, CAD system, computer game, or spreadsheet can be just as much an immersive environment."
The place of the body As this very brief discussion has shown, it is meaningless to reason about place without considering the central role of the body or our being-there.
Empirical treatments of place
Recent literature in environmental psychology is rich in empirically derived models of the lived experience of place. (The concept under study is variously labelled -with slightly different if overlapping definitions -as sense of place, place identity, place attachment and place dependence.) We have reviewed this material in more detail elsewhere (Turner and Turner, in submission), but in brief, the approach is generally one of interview and questionnaire surveys of perceived feelings towards, and conceptualisations of, places significant to individuals. Not infrequently, sense of place scales are derived from the results. In some studies, the places concerned are selected by the researchers, in others by the participants themselves, but in almost all the participants have long-term involvement with the location. There are scattered accounts of shorter-term experience, but these are confined to place attachment, the reasons for fondness for place.
Actions, Conceptions And Physical Attributes
Canter's work (1977) is among the landmarks in this genre of place literature, proposing a threefold model comprising relationships between actions, conceptions and physical attributes. Similarly, Sixsmith (1986) identifies personal, social and physical dimensions in a study of the meanings of 'home'. Canter's original structure is extended some two decades later in the application of facet theory (a mean of dealing with complex multidimensional data) to place research (Canter, 1997) . The facets in this case are activities belonging to the place (the facet of functional differentiation), physical characteristics (aspects of design), individual, social and cultural goals (place objectives) and the scale of the place -e.g. whether an individual room or an entire city (scale of interaction). Canter's approach is robustly positivist, refuting the usefulness of 'personal value judgements… being treated as if they were technical definitions for the existence of common experiences' (Canter, 1997:117) . Typical of more recent work in this vein, Gustafson (2001) proposes a highly detailed model of meanings of place organised around the three poles of 'self, 'environment' and 'others', integrating his own empirical work with concepts from the literature. A rather different approach to rationalising sense of place is provided by Jorgensen and Stedman (2002) , who draw on classical psychological attitude theory to define sense of place as beliefs about the relationship between self and place (the cognitive component of the attitude), feelings towards the place (the affective component) and the behaviours afforded by the place (the conative or behavioural component).
Many other examples could be cited, but in summary, the experience of place is characterised by empiricists as (i) grounded in the physical characteristics of the environment, and interaction with it, but also (ii) bound up with the individual's previous experience and expectations, while in many models it is (iii) a social phenomenon, and almost always (iv) a property of long-term engagement with the environment in question. While the first two aspects are crucial for any attempt to create a contextualised presence in virtual environments, the latter two are significant constraints to basing this work on current empirical models of place and exploiting existing sense of place scales. For the present at least, interacting with others in immersive HMD or even CAVE-mediated environments is cumbersome or impossible except through the restricted medium of avatars. Moreover, technical limitations in current photo-realistic environments such as BENOGO prevent the similarly photo-realistic representation of other human beings (or any other moving objects) in the space created. And while these technological obstacles will certainly be overcome in the future, it is difficult to conceive of long-term engagement with a particular virtual environment over a period of months or years. (MUDS and similar environments are wellacknowledged exceptions to this, but here we are concerned with endeavours to re-create realworld places.)
First-person, embodied perspectives on place
First person, embodied and phenomenological accounts of place are more interesting for the VR context. In contrast to generalised empirically-based accounts of place, there is a stimulating body of work which is unapologetically individual and deeply phenomenological in character. It is significant for the consideration of virtual places, since these -at least when mediated by head-mounted display or CAVEs -are intrinsically individual experiences. This literature commonly manifests as direct first-person accounts of relationships with particular places, or hermeneutic readings of physical environments. The approach is best explained by illustration from representative examples. In this pair of extracts from Stefanovic (1998) , the author explores how two radically different urban environments both succeed in creating a sense of place. The first piece relates to the town of Cavtat on the Adriatic coast, the second to Mississauga, a suburb of Toronto. Both are deeply familiar to the Stefanovic: the paper "…reflects a personal journey to two, particularly special places of being-at-home."
"… the three spiritual landmarks invoking the centrality of place testify to a depth of tradition and an awareness of the belonging together of finitude, dwelling and human destiny. The Mausoleum, with its cemetery of rows of pure, white headstones, is approached gradually at the end of a lengthy climb uphill along stone steps, and the reward is a panoramic treasure-view of sky, water and sun."
"Overall, the image of the settlement as a whole is of the non-threatening: the homogeneity from one identical garage to the next seems to signify that nothing is unexpected. No risks are implied by virtue of enigmatic spatial patterns to disrupt the notion of a perfectly ordered, and safe community. The message, indeed, is of a secure environment, of shelter, of refuge, of insideness and a cradling against any threats from the outside world." (Stefanovic, 1998: 34 & 41) Note in the first extract how the environment is experienced through bodily movement. Physical sensation is very much part of these phenomenological accounts of place, as can be seen in this extract from Downing (2003) , a meditative discussion of how designers' memories of significant places are pivotal to the creation of meaningful environments.
[The kitchen] was also a place of sensuous delights, a place of fragrances: mouthwatering roasts, mashed potatoes, homemade breads, and pies that were to-die-for. The aroma of food wove through the intimate dramas of our gatherings and makes this 'place' one my nose and mouth can re-create before my mind's eye can conjure it visually… It was also a place of family history. By being small and quiet, I gained admission to confidences concerning other people's lives. If I stayed under the table long enough, I would eventually hear of heartbreak, love, hate… (Downing, 2003 :215) Downing's material, in identifying recurring patterns in designers' relationships with placesecret places, gregarious places, places of comfort, among others -also demonstrates how individual accounts may be brought together without losing their intensely personal qualities.
The distillation of patterns or themes is a common element in the phenomenologicallyinformed place literature, retaining elements of the richness of individual sources while allowing authors to move beyond the particular. Indeed, environmental themes engendering place and its antithesis, placelessness, are central to Relph's 1976 monograph; the prototypical (and still much-cited), instance of the phenomenological approach to place. He characterises place identity thus:
"…the static physical setting, the activities and the meanings -constitute the three basic elements of the identity of places. A moment's reflection suggests that this division, although obvious, is a fundamental one. For example, it is possible to visualise a town as consisting of buildings and physical objects, as is represented in air photographs. A strictly objective observer of the activities of people within this physical context would observe their movements much as an entomologist observes ants, some moving in regular patterns, some consuming objects and so on. But a person experiencing these buildings and activities sees them as far more than thisthey are beautiful or ugly, useful or hindrances, home, factory, enjoyable, alienating; in short, they are meaningful." (Relph, 1997:47) Relph's discussion of 'insideness' and 'outsideness' offers a compelling insight for contextualising the VR experience. For an individual to feel inside a place is to feel safe, athome and attached to the place. To experience outsideness is to experience the reverse of these states. (The dialectic insideness-outsideness is closely related to Heidegger's concepts of 'in' and 'dwelling discussed above) The modes of insideness and outsideness offer a valuable classification and vocabulary for describing and understanding people's response to virtual re-creation of place. They are briefly described below. The description draws on the commentary on Relph's work by Seamon (http://www.arch.ksu.edu/seamon/index.htm). Seamon himself is also a prominent phenomenological geographer; his review of methodology in this domain (ibid) is an extremely useful survey (although his discussion of some techniques may not be entirely in accord with other phenomenologists).
Existential insideness
The feeling of attachment and being at home. Place is "experienced without deliberate and self-conscious reflection yet is full of significances". Existential outsideness
Feeling separate from or out of place. Place may feel alienating, unreal, or unpleasant. Examples include feelings of homelessness and homesickness. Objective outsideness A deliberate dispassionate separation from place. Place is a thing to be studied and manipulated.
Incidental outsideness
Place is experienced as the mere background for activities. For example, the experience of the landscape streaming past as one drives somewhere, or the cityscape visible from an anonymous conference suite.
Behavioural insideness
This type of insideness involves deliberate attention to the qualities of a place. Place is perceived as a set of entities, views and/or activities.
Empathetic insideness
Here a person is trying to be open to a place and to understand it better. The necessary pre-conditions are a genuine interest or care / concern for the place.
Vicarious insideness
Deeply-felt second-hand involvement with place. One is transported through imagination -through paintings, novels, music, film and other creative media.
transported through imagination -through paintings, novels, music, film and other creative media.
This subtle, nuanced range of relationships with place appears to have far greater potential as a means of discussing and evaluating contextualised presence than variants on the simple question "How far did you feel present in the environment you have experienced?" It also affords a means of considering place experiences distinct from those arising from long-term engagement. As such, it allows for considering the some relationships to places -or virtual places -as a form of tourism, a paradigm which we consider further in the next section.
Discussion and further work
At present, the users of virtual reality systems are (broadly) either researchers, experimental subjects, games players, members of the military or trainees learning their way around something like the ISS. Collectively they are all (not only those participants in explicit virtual being-in-another-place applications such as BENOGO) virtual reality tourists. A tourist is someone who has travelled to another place for a brief sojourn, an experience that necessarily entails a distinct period of transition and discontinuity from the everyday world. In Relph's terms, the successful tourist experience, depending on individual disposition, is one of behavioural or empathetic insideness, or in unsympathetic conditions one of incidental or even existential outsideness. The concept of virtual reality as tourism brings together a fair representation of the actual process of donning an HMD and being transported to another world and the first-person experience of being elsewhere. This leaves the vexed question as to the role of the body. While a convincing case for the importance of the body in the creation and experience of place has been made by Merleau-Ponty and others, the state of current VR technology is not up to the task. Instead we argue that the role of the body in virtual environments can be attenuated by recognising that a tourist's corporeality may be less important than their visual sense. Virtual environments visited by the tourist are subject to what Urry (2002) describes as the tourist gaze. Recalling Foucault's medical gaze, Urry notes that the tourist gaze is 'directed to features of the landscape, which separate them off from everyday experience. Such aspects are viewed because they are taken to be in some sense out of the ordinary." Often the gaze is static, from a vantage point such as a balcony or 'official' viewpoint, or if mobile, insulated from the world by the windows of a train or the route of a sign-posted walk. The gaze is directed by anticipation and imagination, by the promotional narratives of the tourism industry, by cultural stereotypes and expectations. Both tourists and prime tourist sites are manipulated so that the gaze falls upon what the gazer expects to see -untidy aspects of real life are tidied away or outlawed, (houses in the English Lake District must be built to traditional styles and of traditional materials) and the 'typical' features brought to prominence (for example by routing the tourist on scenic walks or populating historic sites with artisans in traditional costume.) Some places -French towns are particularly good at this -prime the tourist gaze by announcing the attractions on the place-name sign marking the town boundary "ses églises, son marché, ses fromages…" As Culler notes, tourists act as semioticians, reading the landscape for signifiers of certain pre-established notions or signs derived from various discourses of travel and tourism (Culler: 1981:128) . Returning to the tourist gaze, Urry details nine different aspects (his numbering is preserved) of which we present a sample of the more relevant to the current discussion:
2. Tourist relationships arise from a movement of people to, and their stay in, various destinations. This necessarily involves some movement through space, that is the journeys, and periods of stay in a new place or places. The adoption of the metaphor of the tourist and his or her accompanying selective gaze discloses a new way to reason about, design and evaluate both traditional and contextualised virtual environments.
Further work
We have highlighted aspects from the philosophical treatments of place, the body and beingin-the-world which suggested how such approaches may contribute to creating contextualised presence and have led us to propose the metaphor of the virtual tourist. We have also seen how the phenomenological approach have been used to great effect in the understanding of the experience of place. We conclude by identifying further work which might be undertaken in pursuit of the aim of contextualising virtual environments. The three main research lines are: 1. Making 'reality' more tractable and … 2. Designing for the tourist gaze 3. Employing chiaroscuro rather than photorealism.
While the first two of these research questions are logically separate, they are more naturally treated as two aspects of the same issue.
Restricted Reality And The Tourist Gaze
Recreating real places using virtual reality is the stuff of science fiction. The computational demands of recreating a place which would satisfy for all of our senses are astronomical (there are also telling in principle objections too). One way of dealing with this problem is to, in some sense, restrict reality. This is already true of real world tourism. Urry has demonstrated that being a tourist is to be managed; is being exposed to a cut-down (inauthentic) version of the place being visited; is to be whisked along the tourist trail in an air-conditioned coach. Elsewhere, we have suggested that the recreation of real places might be restricted to viewpoints -where we are encouraged to gaze at a feature from the comfort of a public car park. Alternately we might recreate places which can only be viewed from a particular range of orientations and elevations (Turner and Turner, in press ). This is the stuff of stage design from which we can learn.
Having constrained reality we now turn our attention to the question of priming the tourist. Without wishing to overstretch the metaphor, we must prepare the VR participant for their 'trip'. Real world tourists read guide books, watch travel programmes and generally invest in their trip, constructing a narrative of the journey long before closing the front door. It is, after all supposed to be pleasurable or interesting. We need, then to investigate managing the transition from the real to the virtual world. Once there, the tourist orients themselves, heads for the key attractions; follows the signage; display canonical behaviour. We need to establish, develop the equivalents in virtual environments. In short, we need to find ways to prime or direct our VR tourists so that the essential elements which convey a sense of place attract the gaze.
Chiaroscuro Rather Than Photorealism
The third line of research we have identified would remove the focus on the fidelity of recreation of a real place, and instead draw inspiration from the use of chiaroscuro by artists, the practice of stage and set designers, the reinforcing role of narrative and the research of place and tourism researchers. Artists such as JMW Turner, for example, deconstructed the traditional water colour technique further in his fine gradations of colour and light. His portrayals of Venice are a compelling instance of the creation of a sense of place through a 2-dimensional canvas. In many of his works, Turner's Venice is conveyed through impressionistic sketches, details are absent or vague, the edges of the space ill-defined. Yet the spectator is transported to the Rialto or St. Mark's Square. Chiaroscuro is a technique which employs light and shade in pictorial representation to achieve a heightened illusion of depth -to model body and form more clearly and to create an emotional response to the scene.
In raising the possibilities of adopting such an approach with one our colleagues on the BENOGO project, she commented, "[having worked] as a scenographer mean to arrange space by using different effects (movement, time, space, light, sound, texture, colour, smell and temperature) to generate the desired feelings. Working with the physical environment as VR, means to transport the sensed data from the physical world to the virtual environment. The problem by finding the essence of a place is that it may become very subjective because the person who tries to find the essence reads his or her own feelings being in that place".
